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Over a decade after it was first introduced, community policing
remains the most important innovation in American policing today. Called
"the most significant era in police organizational change since the
introduction of the telephone, automobile, and two way radio,"' community
policing has been supported by the past three Presidents, Congress, every
major police organization, and much of the public. 2 A broad cross-section
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1 Edward R. Maguire & William Wells, Community Policing as Communication Reform,
in LAW ENFORCEMENT, COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY 33, 33 (Howard Giles ed., 2002).
2 Edward R. Maguire & Charles M. Katz, Community Policing, Loose Coupling, and
Sensemaking in American Police Agencies, 19 JUST. Q. 503, 504 (2002); see also Wesley G.
Skogan, Preface to COMMUNITY POLICING: CAN IT WORK?, at xii (Wesley Skogan ed., 2004)
(community policing "is so widely known and popular with the public and city councils that
it is hard to find a police chief that does not claim that his or her department is on board
because they have adopted this or that community-friendly program");WESLEY G. SKOGAN
ET AL., ON THE BEAT: POLICE AND COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING 21 (1999) (reporting that
by 1997, fifty-four percent of police departments had adopted some type of community
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of the legal academy also endorses community policing. Those who seek
new ways for inner-city communities to mobilize against disorder and
crime support it, 3 as do others whose principal concern is reducing police
abuse of minorities.4
In this Article, I will argue both that there is much to be said for
community policing and that it has not reached its potential. The flaw, I
suggest, is that a critical group-youth and young adults-has largely been
left out of the new policing model. Community policing rejects the
discredited "warrior" approach to policing, in which inner-city communities
were viewed as implacably hostile to the policing enterprise. Yet I will
show how this warrior model persists for the young, who are still viewed as
targets of policing rather than as assets to it.
The bad news is that leaving young people out of this new model of
policing has tremendous implications. Public safety turns, to a great extent,
on what the young do and what is done to them. This is the group most
likely to engage in criminal conduct, to be victims of crime, and to be
targeted by police. By treating the young exclusively as threats to public
order, the state creates and reinforces attitudes of hostility and opposition.
This has negative consequences for public safety, because oppositional
attitudes can increase law-breaking and make it less likely that citizens will
provide information to law enforcement. Further, as the central
representative of the state in inner-city communities, what the police do
(and what they teach by what they do) has implications beyond policing.
The alienation generated by the warrior model creates costs that are borne
not just by youth themselves, but by their neighbors and the rest of society.
The good news is that the warrior model of policing the inner-city
young is built on premises that are faulty, and therefore can be corrected.
Despite the powerful image of urban youth as threats, most delinquent and
policing and another twenty-eight percent were in the process of doing so).
3 See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1513, 1527-30 (2002); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL.
L. REv. 1593 (2002).
4 See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 192-94 (1999); CHARLES OGLETREE ET AL.,
BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY
COMMUNIES 127-30 (1995); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race
and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 1010 (1999) (advocating "a race-
conscious community policing model"); see also PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE
DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 193-97 (1999) (arguing that community
policing is a preferable alternative to incarceration-oriented approaches for adolescent
offenders); THE L.A. COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEP'T, A REPORT BY SPECIAL COUNSEL JAMES G.
KOLTS 285 (July 1992) ("[W]e view the immediate, Department-wide implementation of




criminal conduct is concentrated among a small percentage of young
people. The rest-the majority-are law-abiders. Moreover, they are the
principal victims of the law-breaking minority. They therefore have a
profound stake in keeping their neighborhoods (and themselves) safe.
Coupled with their interest in reducing police abuse and harassment, this
gives the young powerful incentive to participate in the community policing
enterprise.
Moreover, just as the warrior model alienates young people from the
police and society, community policing offers to do the opposite. A
growing body of empirical research establishes that people's satisfaction
with the legal system, including the police, is determined not by whether
they are satisfied with the outcome of the decision, but instead by whether
they believe the process was fair. These findings have powerful
implications for community policing. Not all community policing is equal,
as I will explore. But some versions offer citizens the opportunity to
participate in regular group deliberations with neighbors and local officers
to set community policing priorities. To date, young people have not
generally been involved in this type of policing. But a model that included
the young would place them alongside other community members and
officers in trust-engendering deliberations regarding matters of community
safety. This process would, in turn, increase law enforcement's legitimacy
in their eyes, by increasing their respect for the process of police decision-
making.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Section I, I will outline how
community policing developed out of dissatisfaction with the antagonism
caused by the warrior model. Because community policing is a term that
has been used to describe quite disparate concepts, in this Section I will
define what I mean by it. I will also emphasize what I view as the
enormous potential of community policing to increase local regulation of
law enforcement. I will do this by contrasting community policing to what
I call the "judicial control" model, in which judges attempt to regulate
police conduct through enforcement of the Fourth Amendment.
In Section II, I will describe how community policing has failed to
change the way the inner-city young are policed. Young people are less
likely than older citizens to be involved in the community meetings and
other venues where the community policing agenda is set. Further, they are
more likely to be stopped, disrespected, and illegally searched by the police
on the streets. I will then turn to the rhetoric regarding the young, and
argue that here too they appear solely as threats and objects of intervention.
I will suggest that part of the reason for this portrayal is that community
policing gained currency just as youth crime, especially youth homicide,
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increased dramatically. Because our national imagination was fixed on the
image of the adolescent and post-adolescent "super-predator," it was
difficult to see that same group as potential assets to the community
policing agenda.
In Section III, I will justify my claim that we should view youth as
assets, and I will explore the costs of our failure to do so. First, I will
describe the investment the young have in influencing police behavior and
fighting crime. Second, I will outline society's stake in using all
mechanisms at its disposal-including law enforcement-to reinforce
bonds of trust and faith in law's legitimacy among the inner-city young.
Drawing on sociological research, I will suggest that many youth and young
adults in urban areas are "walking a tightrope," between what Elijah
Anderson has called "street" and "decent" values. 5 Perhaps the greatest evil
of warrior policing is that, because it is perceived as illegitimate and unfair,
it encourages its targets to adopt street values. On the other hand, I will
argue, the state has the power to increase law's legitimacy by adopting
policing practices that are perceived as procedurally fair.
In Section IV, I describe in greater detail what a model of community
policing that engages young people would look like. Through an
examination of novel and promising policing experiments in Chicago and
Boston, I will outline the model's core principles. I will also describe some
potential pitfalls, and discuss how they might be avoided.
I. THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY POLICING
A. BACKGROUND TO COMMUNITY POLICING
Community policing grew out of a variety of sources,6 but of central
importance was the growing consensus in the 1970s and 1980s that police-
community relationships in many cities had become untenable.7 Many
departments and individual officers had long subscribed to the "warrior
model" of the detached, aloof crime-fighter who daily battles the hostile
5 ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE AND THE MORAL LIFE OF
THE INNER CITY 35-65 (1999).
6 A comprehensive history of community policing has not yet been written. What I offer
here is a highly truncated summary. Existing historical summaries include Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities,
and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 565-78 (1997), and Maguire & Wells, supra
note 1, at 33-39.
7 See, e.g., Jack R. Greene, Community Policing and Organization Change, in
COMMUNITY POLICING: CAN IT WORK?, supra note 2, at 30, 35 (describing minority
communities' alienation from police in the 1960s).
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enemy-the public. 8 Indeed, it was something of a matter of faith in many
city forces that citizens were inalterably opposed to the police, and therefore
would never cooperate regardless of what the police did. William
Westley's 1970 study, for example, found that seventy-three percent of
officers believed that the public was "against the police" or "hates the
police." Thirteen percent believed that "some are for us, some against us,"
while only twelve percent believed that the public "likes the police." 9
Similarly, a Kerner Commission study found that most big city policeman
believed that the public saw them as "brutal, annoying, and
inconsiderate." 10
Community policing gained further support when police officials
confronted new criminological findings demonstrating the inadequacy of
many traditional police tactics."1 This research, conducted principally in the
1970s, questioned the value of increasing the number of patrol officers,
showed the limited utility of random and saturation patrol, and cast doubt
on the efficacy of rapid response to 911 calls. Moreover, it suggested that
police officers spent relatively little time fighting violent crime, and instead
spent the bulk of their shifts passively patrolling and providing other
services. Finally, the research showed that most crimes are not solved by
investigation, but rather because an offender is arrested immediately on the
scene or the police are given specific identifying information such as a
name, address, or license plate number. In total, the research undermined
many of policing's core assumptions, thereby creating an opening for
reformers to offer new approaches. 
12
8 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 82-85 (1996).
9 WILLIAM WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW,
CUSTOM AND MORALITY 93 (1970); see also WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT,
COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 79 (1997) (less than twenty percent of Chicago
officers believed that police-citizen relations were very good, about half believed that people
do not respect the police, over seventy percent thought that citizens do not understand the
problems of the police, and over eighty percent said that most people do not know how
difficult the job of police is); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 117 (Rev. ed.
1983) ("The view of many big city police officers seems to confirm the 'war' theory of
police-community relations. Data gathered at least as far back as 1960 suggest that most
big-city officers see the citizenry as at best uncooperative and at worst hostile.").
10 W. Eugene Groves, Police in the Ghetto, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 103, 106 (1968).
1 For a review of the research discussed in this paragraph, see JEROME SKOLNICK &
DAVID BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES 3-5
(1986).
12 Some of the early reform efforts-upon which community policing today is built-
include team policing, community crime prevention, problem-oriented policing, and fear
reduction strategies. Wesley G. Skogan & Jeffrey A. Roth, Introduction to COMMUNITY
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With crime and fear of crime rising, community relations at a low, and
research questioning the efficacy of the current approaches, some within
policing circles began to conclude that the warrior strategy was failing.
3
But replacing the warrior strategy required a paradigm shift that was not
entirely easy. It meant questioning the entrenched belief that the public-
especially minority residents of inner cities-was implacably hostile to the
policing enterprise. This required police to recognize that although inner-
city residents were more critical than were other Americans, substantial
majorities nonetheless held generally favorable views of police. 14  Even
more profoundly, it meant understanding that even those who were critical
did not want less policing-they generally wanted more, and better,
protection. 15 As the Kerner Commission found, "[t]he strength of ghetto
feelings about hostile police conduct may even be exceeded by the
conviction that ghetto neighborhoods are not given adequate police
protection.'
' 6
The recognition of this reservoir of community support for policing
was connected to a broader understanding that even high-crime
communities are made up principally of law-abiders. Community policing
was built on the import of these findings, and its challenge was to replace
the warrior model with one premised on the notion that the police and
community could become co-producers of public safety, rather than hostile
antagonists. 17
B. DEFINING COMMUNITY POLICING
But exactly what is community policing? This definitional issue arises
POLICING: CAN IT WORK?, supra note 2, at xviii-xxiii.
13 KELLING & COLES, supra note 8, at 85.
14 SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY AND CRIME IN
AMERICA 91 (2000).
15 For a thoughtful discussion of how black citizens balance the desire for additional
police presence with concerns about unfettered police discretion, see generally Richard R.W.
Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness
in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (2000).
16 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 307 (1968); see also George L. Kelling, Acquiring A Taste
for Order: The Community and Police, 33 CRIME & DELNQ. 90, 94 (1987) ("Despite the
contrary belief of some citizens ,and police that minority residents do not respect police, the
great majority do.... They believe that police have not been a tangible presence, engaged
with citizens to develop neighborhood peace and security.").
17 Cf SUSAN MILLER, GENDER AND COMMUNITY POLICING 194 (1999) ("Community
policing programs often adopt the language of the business world, which entails seeing
residents as 'customers' who are 'invested' in the joint production of community stability.").
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because the term has come to refer to a wide variety of police tactics.18 For
Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan, two of community policing's leading
advocates, it can mean neighborhood prayer vigils, gang loitering
ordinances, and "order maintenance" strategies, in which police
aggressively prosecute offenses such as panhandling, vagrancy, or
prostitution. 19 In the press, community policing can mean officers playing
basketball with kids in housing projects and smiling at babies. 20
These tactics, however, are just that-tactics. At its core, community
policing is not a set of tactics, but instead is an organizational strategy for
running a department. In its most promising form, this strategy has two
essential elements. First, it requires that citizens, at the neighborhood level,
meet regularly with police to jointly define neighborhood crime problems
and set police priorities. 21 This consultation serves four functions: (1) it
allows neighborhood residents to express their concerns and needs; (2) it
gives police a forum to educate citizens about neighborhood crime issues;
(3) it allows citizens to state complaints about the police themselves; and
18 David Bayley was one of the first to point out that community policing "means
different things to different people-public relations campaigns, shopfront and mini-police
stations, rescaled patrol beats, liaison with ethnic groups, permission for the rank-and-file to
speak to the press, Neighborhood Watch, foot patrols, patrol-detective teams, and door-to-
door visits by police officers." David H. Bayley, Community Policing: A Report from the
Devil's Advocate, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 225, 225 (Jack Greene &
Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988). More recent evaluations of community policing indicate
that Bayley's analysis remains true today. See Jeffrey A. Roth et al., Trends in the Adoption
of Community Policing, in COMMUNITY POLICING: CAN IT WORK?, supra note 2, at 4
("Reasonable people could (and still do) argue over" the proper objectives and strategies of
"real community policing."); Skogan & Roth, supra note 12, at xvii (Although "police chiefs
report that they are moving toward" community policing, "[w]hat they say they are doing
when they do community policing varies a great deal .. "); see also Michael E. Buerger,
The Challenge of Reinventing Police and Community, in POLICE INNOVATION AND CONTROL
OF THE POLICE: PROBLEMS OF LAW, ORDER AND COMMIJNITY 103, 104-5, 108-11 (David
Weisburd & Craig Uchida eds., 1993).
19 Kahan, supra note 3, at 1527-30 (order maintenance strategies); Meares, supra note 3,
at 1612-19 (prayer vigils); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms o]) Order
in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805, 819-21 (1998) (gang loitering ordinances).
20 Michael Massing, The Blue Revolution, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Nov. 19, 1998, at
32, 33 (describing 1996 Time Magazine cover story).
21 LORIE FRIDELL ET AL., POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, RACIALLY BIASED
POLICING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 100 (2001) ("Police department efforts to provide
significant means for community input into police operational and policy decisions are the
backbone of community engagement."); Maryann Wycoff, The Benefits of Community
Policing: Evidence and Conjecture, in COMMUNITY POLICING:, RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra
note 18, at 103, 105 ("It is the commitment to listening to citizens (as opposed simply to
talking to them) and to taking seriously citizens' definitions of their own problems that




(4) it gives police a chance to report back on what actions they have taken
and what successes (or not) they have had.22 The second critical element is
that, citizens, again at the local level, take responsibility for helping to
address the problems that they have identified. 3
The distinctiveness of my definition becomes clear when it is
contrasted with how others have described community policing. Consider,
for example, David Cole's account:
[Community policing], already under way in many departments across the country,
tries to make the police an integral part of the neighborhoods they serve through more
decentralized police stations, more foot patrols, and regular meetings with citizens in
the community. Where such programs develop effective channels for communication
between the police and the community about their respective needs, the programs can
play an important role in restoring community trust and overcoming the adversarial
relationships too many police departments have with disadvantaged communities.
24
In Cole's account, no one "channel of communication" is regarded as
primary. What's said at "regular meetings" is not necessarily more
significant than what is said when officers talk to citizens while on foot
patrol or informally at decentralized police stations. In my account, by
contrast, these informal contacts matter,25 but formal, deliberative meetings
between police and community residents are the heart of the matter.26
Chicago, which I will discuss in additional detail in Section IV, has
22 Maguire & Katz, supra note 2, at 510-11.
23 KELLING & COLES, supra note 8, at 168; William Geller, As a Blade of Grass Cuts
Through Stone: Helping Rebuild Urban Neighorhoods Through Unconventional Police-
Community Partnerships, 44 CRiME & DELINQ. 154 (1998); Wesley G. Skogan, The
Community's Role in Community Policing, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. J., AUG. 1996, at 31, 34.
24 COLE, supra note 4, at 192-93.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
26 Many police programs that call themselves community policing do not systematically
involve community residents in the process of establishing policing priorities and tactics.
Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies have argued that the New York Police Department
abandoned such a community-centered practice in favor of one where community needs and
standards were defined by police leadership, relying on a sophisticated data driven
management accountability system known as Compstat. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies,
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder in New York City, 28
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457, 472 (2000); see also Skogan & Roth, supra note 12, at xxiii ("New
York's model also did not feature any community input into identifying problems or setting
police priorities, ignoring the concept of partnership that figures so prominently in the
community policing paradigm."). Michael Buerger warned that such an approach is not
atypical; too often community policing "is rio more than a unilateral police decree, defining
the police relationship to the public in symbolic form only, without any necessary change in
police practice or structure." Buerger, supra note 18, at 105; see also Greene, supra note 7,
at 50 (warning that police may not have changed their practices, but instead "effectively
repackaged their efforts with a community and problem-oriented label").
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perhaps the most thoroughly developed (and thoroughly evaluated)
community policing program. In the Chicago Alternative Police Strategy
(CAPS), community policing is implemented principally through "beat
meetings," where citizens and police from a particular neighborhood meet
regularly to discuss and define community crime and order problems. In
addition, Chicago employs "District advisory committees," where selected
neighborhood representatives meet regularly with District commanders to
discuss neighborhood conditions and police responses.27
As I have mentioned, a variety of tactics can emerge from this
organizational strategy. For example, citizens often say what matters most
to them are neighborhood disorder issues-which can include anything
from abandoned cars to rowdy teenagers. In other neighborhoods, the
problems might include loitering outside an un-staffed recreation center,
chronic drug dealing on a particular comer, or unsolved robberies.28
Sometimes citizens wish to complain about the tactics of individual police
officers, including racial profiling, stopping of innocent young people in the
neighborhood, or disrespecting neighborhood residents.29 In each of these
cases, community policing gives citizens a way to raise these issues directly
with police and one another, a process for collective deliberation, and a
mechanism to prompt both government and collective community action.30
C. COMMUNITY POLICING AS REGULATION
This description of community policing highlights one of its greatest,
and at the same time most underappreciated, virtues-it provides a way to
achieve meaningful community-based regulation of a broad swath of police
conduct. Such community-based regulation is not the only way to influence
police behavior; indeed, it has not been the principal mode of regulation
with which the legal academy has been interested. The focus of the legal
scholars has traditionally been on what I call the "judicial control" model of
regulating police. But I will argue here that community policing has the
potential to regulate police more effectively than does the traditional model.
27 SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 9, at 110-60.
28 ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 153-
58, 179-210 (2004) (describing beat meetings in three Chicago neighborhoods).
29 Jenny Berrien & Christopher Winship, An Umbrella of Legitimacy: Boston's Police
Department-Ten Point Coalition Collaboration, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE: NEW
APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 200, 216 (Gary S. Katzmann ed.,
2002); Jeffrey Fagan, Policing Guns and Youth Violence, 12 CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND GUN
VIOLENCE 133, 137 (2002), at www.futureofchildren.org.
30 This process does not always work equally well. In Section IV, I discuss institutional
arrangements that impact the effectiveness of this process.
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The judicial control model of regulating the police is premised on
judicial oversight of police-citizen contacts, principally through
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 31 Defenders of the judicial control model typically
criticize the post-Warren Court for cutting back on Fourth Amendment
protections, and argue that police over-reaching and abuse requires more
vigilant judicial enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. 32
This approach has not gone unchallenged. Some of community
policing's staunchest defenders take the opposite perspective, arguing that
pervasive judicial regulation has hamstrung police, who they say need more
discretion.33 George Kelling, for example, says that community policing is
"inherently proactive," and that such a preventive approach to crime
fighting has inevitable consequences for police departments and local
governments.
The main consequence is that police strategy shifts from a reactive and inherently
passive model to a preventive interventionist model that reopens policy issues about
police handling of the homeless, drunks, drug dealers and users, the emotionally
disturbed, and minor offenders that many believed had been addressed once and for
all during the period following the 1960s. This strategic change takes police to the
edge, or even over the edge, of constitutional law-at least as it has been interpreted
over the past 30 years.
Though I am advocating a form of community policing, I do not do so
on the grounds that police need license to go "over the edge .. .of
constitutional law." 35  I do not share the view of community policing
31 There are innumerable examples of this approach. Some of the most thoughtful
include BERNARD HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF ORDER (2001); Albert W. Alschuler &
Stephen Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors
Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215; David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and
Discrimination Reconsidered A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1059 (1999); David Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1 (1994); and Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 333 (1998).
32 See Cole, supra note 31, at 1071; Lenese Herbert, Bete Noire: How Race-Based
Policing Threatens National Security, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 149, 157 (2003); Yale Kamisar,
In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 119,
122-25 (2003).
33 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998). For Kahan and Meares, the modem criminal
procedure regime tightly constrains police "and subject[s] them to stringent judicial
monitoring." Id. at 1168. They argue that while such an approach may have made sense in
the historical context in which it arose, it no longer does. Id. at 1166-71.





advocates who argue that the judiciary has over-regulated police. To the
contrary, I argue that the police are under regulated in some important
ways. In fact, my suggestion is that both sides of this debate overstate how
much the Fourth Amendment matters to what happens on the street. The
pro-discretion camp overstates the extent to which judicial decisions have
limited police discretion. And the pro-regulation camp overstates the extent
to which the Fourth Amendment can ever effectively regulate police-citizen
encounters. What both sides overlook is how much of what the police do is
beyond the Fourth Amendment's constraints. The truth is that no matter
how vigorously it is enforced, the Fourth Amendment governs a small slice
of policing.
To see the limits of regulation via the Fourth Amendment, consider the
following scenario presented by Tracey Maclin, a leading proponent of the
judicial control model. His article, Race and the Fourth Amendment, opens
with a description of an incident that he says is "illustrative of the low-
visibility, high-tension police confrontations that often occur in black
neighborhoods and with black men:"
It was 72 degrees and sunny in Homestead, a town just south of Pittsburgh ....
At 3:10 in the afternoon, the police and the young black men standing on Amity are
playing the usual cat-and-mouse game. Two officers in a cruiser drive slowly past the
men and stare, silently sending the word: don't hang too long. The men shrug the
police off, walking casually away, but only until the car is out of sight. Then they
regroup.
The game continues for the rest of the day and into the night. Police drive quietly by
three more times. On the fourth pass, they order the men to move or "somebody's
going to jail."
Finally, two of the men give it up and leave for home. On the way, police stop and
search them. An officer notices a marijuana cigarette on the sidewalk and asks where
it came from. The men say they don't know. The police let them go.
A half-hour later, officers stop three more of the original group on Amity Street and
pat them down.
No arrest is made. But the message has been sent.
36
From the perspective of the men in this example, and others like them,
the episode raises numerous issues, in addition to the legality of the
officers' decision to search them. Why were the police in that
neighborhood? Why were they patrolling in that manner? How long did
the police have the men under surveillance, and why? What remedies exist,
36 Maclin, supra note 31, at 333 n. 1.
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since the men were searched but not arrested? What are the mechanisms to
hold the officers accountable? What opportunities are there for community
members to complain to these officers or their supervisors about their
conduct? What structures exist to facilitate policy change based on that
dialogue? And what crime and disorder is going unaddressed while the
officers are playing this "cat and mouse game"?
Despite the breadth of issues raised, a focus on judicial enforcement of
the Fourth Amendment requires Maclin to propose a solution that is quite
narrow-he suggests that once a defendant has raised evidence of race-
based targeting, the government should be forced to provide a race-neutral
explanation for the stop.37 Because this is regulation under the Fourth
Amendment, Maclin is limited to focusing on the moment of the stop or
seizure of the citizen. But as the example makes clear, from the citizen's
perspective, the stop or seizure, while significant, is not all that matters.
One response to the problem I have identified is to offer a vision of the
Fourth Amendment that would sweep more than simply the stop itself into
the inquiry. For example, one reading of "search" would include the period
of purposeful surveillance that preceded the stop in Maclin's example.
38
Terry v. Ohio does not indulge this reading-remember that in Terry the
officer watched Mr. Terry for ten to twelve minutes before actually making
physical contact with him, but the Court implied that the Fourth
Amendment did not come into play until the officer touched Terry.39 But
even if the Court were to view the matter differently than it did, this broader
view of "search" to include surveillance would only help a little. Much
police conduct, including most of what upset the men in Maclin's example,
would remain beyond reach of effective enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment.
Perhaps even worse than the fact that it covers only stops, the judicial
control model has almost nothing to say about the largest category of illegal
stops-those that uncover no incriminating evidence. Because such
searches rarely get reviewed in court, there has long been a question of how
common they are. Though many familiar with policing have always
37 Id. at 340-41. I must stress that I do not intend to single out Maclin for criticism.
Instead, I am simply using this example as a way to highlight an endemic tendency in the
Fourth Amendment literature: to describe the problem (discriminatory policing) and the
solution (tighter judicial regulation of Fourth Amendment seizures) with little discussion of
whether the proposed solution would in fact remedy the problem.
38 Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 1097, 1102-04 (1998); see also William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of
Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1021 (1995) (arguing the importance of the
right not to be stigmatized by being singled out and treated as a suspect).
3' 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
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suspected that a substantial percentage of searches are unconstitutional,
there has been little empirical data on the subject. One of the problems with
the data is that the rate of unconstitutional searching has typically been
analyzed by examining the results of suppression motions.40 But searches
that lead to suppression motions are a tiny (and likely unrepresentative)
sample of all searches. That sample does not include, for example, searches
that do not lead to arrests or those in which prosecutors dismiss cases (and
cases occasionally are dismissed precisely because the prosecutor concludes
the stop was bad).
More recent studies have tried to overcome these problems. For
example, New York and federal officials recently looked at the stop and
frisk practices of New York police officers. Though they found that a
remarkably high fifteen percent of searches were unconstitutional, they
relied on data from the officers themselves, which was frequently lacking
and raised questions of bias and selective reporting of facts.4'
The best attempt to address these data flaws is a ground breaking new
study by Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski, which relies on direct
observation of officers in the field.42 In this study, researchers rode with
officers in a medium-sized American city the authors dubbed Middlesberg.
They took notes of what they and the officers saw, and teams of experts
later evaluated the constitutionality of the searches. Evaluators resolved all
doubts in favor of the officers (for example, when an officer said that he
saw a "furtive gesture" that the researcher did not see, the gesture was
recorded as having occurred).43 Still, Gould and Mastrofski found that
thirty percent of the searches they witnessed were unconstitutional. 44
Moreover, in a finding that I shall return to, when younger suspects
(defined as those under the age of thirty) were searched, they were more
likely to be searched unconstitutionally (and the difference was of statistical
significance).45
What role do courts play in monitoring these searches? For the
40 An example of such a study is Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know
(and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and
Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983).
41 CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICE: A REPORT FROM THE OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 160-62 (1999); Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Detects Bias in Police
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2000, at Al.
42 Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 315 (2004).
43 Id. at 319.
44 Id. at 331.
41 Id. at 339.
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reasons I indicated above, very little. The searches were all warrantless, so
there was no ex ante judicial oversight.46 Like the men in Maclin's
example, the majority of those searched illegally did not possess
incriminating evidence to suppress and were not charged. Though in theory
they could sue for damages, the researchers found only two or three cases
where the invasion was egregious enough to support a civil claim.47 As
Gould and Mastofksi put it, "[t]he abuses are, by analogy, a steady
drumbeat of droplets rather than a torrential deluge. ' '4
If the Fourth Amendment has little to offer those who are
unconstitutionally searched but not charged with crimes, it has nothing at
all to say about an even less visible problem-police verbal disrespect of
citizens. Recall the men in Maclin's example, who the police ordered to
move or "somebody's going to jail." Belittling remarks, illegitimate orders,
and cursing, are all-as much as unconstitutional searches-part of what
Terry called "[t]he wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently
complain." 49  Like unconstitutional searches (and for much the same
reasons) there is limited empirical data on this phenomenon. However, a
recent study of St. Petersburg, Florida, and Indianapolis, Indiana, provides
some important information. 50 Field researchers there observed interactions
between police and suspects and recorded disrespectful police behavior.
51
Disrespect included things such as name calling, derogatory statements,
belittling comments, slurs, cursing, or interrupting the citizen (except in an
46 Id. at 335.
47 Id. Many have remarked on the inadequacy of civil remedies in cases where police
behavior is illegal but insufficiently damaging to support a lawsuit. See OGLETREE ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 68 ("[C]ases of misconduct involving verbal abuse or humiliation, short-
term detention after a false arrest, or minor injuries are not likely to be litigated at all.");
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442 n.108 (1997)
(tiny percentage of police misconduct cases that are referred to the ACLU result in action);
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REv.
2001, 2011-12 (1998) (inadequacy of damages and injunctions as remedies to police
misconduct); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 J. CONST. L. 296, 352-55 (2001)
(difficulty of using civil and administrative remedies to redress police harassment); David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1998
SUP. CT. REV. 271, 325 (same).
48 Gould & Mastrofksi, supra note 42, at 334.
49 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
50 Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Police Disrespect Toward the Public: An Encounter-
Based Analysis, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 519 (2002).
5 Citizens were defined as suspects if officers identified them as suspects, or
interrogated, searched, cited, or otherwise treated them as such. Id. at 529.
[Vol. 95
COMMUNITY POLICING
emergency).5 2  Being argumentative by itself was not considered
disrespect.
53
Researchers found that police were disrespectful in nine percent of
interactions with suspects.54 There are two additional findings of particular
importance to this discussion. First, as I will return to later, police were
more likely to be disrespectful to the young and to citizens in
neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage.5 5  Second, and of direct
relevance to the current discussion of the limits of the Fourth Amendment,
is the question of race and police mobilization. Recall again the police-
citizen encounter described in Maclin's example. It began when "two
officers in a cruiser dr[o]ve slowly past the men and stare[d], silently
sending the word: don't hang too long." Why were the police in that
neighborhood, and why were they patrolling like that? This example raises
the issue of police mobilization-which neighborhoods do police patrol,
who do they pay particular attention to, who do they decide to question?
Mobilization is then of fundamental importance because all subsequent
police-citizen interactions flow from it.
If police mobilize to engage minority citizens as suspects more often
than they do whites, or if they mobilize to engage young males as suspects
more often than they do others, then stops, searches, disrespect, and similar
acts are likely to fall upon that group more often. This is so even if the
police are no more disrespectful to the blacks (or young men) who they
stop. This is what the St. Petersberg/Indianapolis study discovered. In fact,
the researchers found that the police were more likely to be disrespectful to
the whites they stopped than to the minorities. But, because police
mobilized against minority suspects at much higher rates, an individual
minority citizen living in one of those cities was much more likely to be
56
stopped and disrespected than was his or her white counterpart.
To sum up, the judicial control model has little relevance to a large
chunk of what matters in policing. It places no limits on, among other
things, which neighborhoods police are deployed to, who they choose to
watch, and how they talk to the citizens they stop. It neither effectively
deters unconstitutional searches from occurring,57 nor does it offer a remedy
for the overwhelming majority of unconstitutional stops and searches once
they have happened. These limitations, when compared to the scope of
52 Id. at 529-30.
53 Id.
54 Id.
" Id. at 539.
56 Id. at 543.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
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police conduct that citizens can themselves regulate under some community
policing models, make community policing a project worth exploring.58
II. POLICING YOUTH: WARRIORS STILL
Given the core principles I mentioned earlier, community policing's
legitimacy and efficacy depend on community involvement that is both
broad and deep. Community policing also requires a re-orientation in
thinking, so that officers begin to see community members as allies, rather
than enemies. In this Section, I will discuss whether community policing
has achieved those goals. I will begin by reviewing community policing's
efforts to secure the involvement of a representative cross-section of
neighborhood residents. The evidence here is mixed: while recent
initiatives have seen high participation rates in the poorest neighborhoods,
there is still a significant age bias, with younger residents less involved in
community policing. I will then examine policing toward the young, and
demonstrate how they continue to be policed exclusively as threats to order.
Finally, I turn to a discussion of the rhetoric around youth and crime, and
outline how community policing's vision of citizens as assets has not yet
extended to young people.
A. WHO PARTICIPATES IN COMMUNITY POLICING?
Early research on community policing initiatives in practice showed
consistent disparities in participation rates. Wesley Skogan's review of
Houston's early program revealed that it favored racially dominant groups
and established interests, while renters, African-Americans, and Hispanics
benefited the least.59  Skogan found similar results in Chicago and
Minneapolis community programs in the 1980s. In those programs, whites
and higher income, long-term residents of single family homes were more
likely than others to get involved.6° Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley
reached similar conclusions in their study of community policing in Santa
Ana, California.6'
Community policing often relies on neighborhood organizations for its
implementation. This can have race and class implications, because
participation rates in local groups tends to be higher among married
58 As I discuss supra in text accompanying notes 21 to 30, and infra Part IV, the full
breadth of police conduct can appropriately be put on the agenda at neighborhood police-
community beat meetings.
59 WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 106-09 (1990).
60 id. at 148, 167.
61 SKOLNICK & BAYLEY, supra note 11, at 31.
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citizens, those with a higher socio-economic status, and homeowners with
children.62  In addition, some research indicates that neighborhood
organizations in wealthier and whiter neighborhoods are more likely to
invest in community policing initiatives than similar groups in
predominantly black and Hispanic neighborhoods.63
In Houston's community policing program, for example, citizen
meetings were almost all held in a part of the neighborhood dominated by
owner occupied single-family homes. Not surprisingly, participation rates
were lower for blacks, who generally lived in another part of the
neighborhood in rental property. 64  Against this backdrop, Skogan
cautioned that,
[t]he police are likely to get along best with the factions that share their outlook. The
"local values" they represent are those of some of the community, but not all. In
heterogeneous neighborhoods, some residents can easily become the targets of the
programs, and are not likely to be happy about that.
65
More recent evidence suggests, however, that it is possible to
achieve high rates of community policing participation in lower income and
minority neighborhoods. Chicago's CAPS program invested heavily in
mass media and community organizing, including a staff of organizers that
publicized the program by visiting churches, neighborhood groups, and
individual residences. 66 As a result, seventy-nine percent of Chicagoans
knew about CAPS in 1998.67 Moreover, the beat level findings from
Chicago reveal that neighborhoods with greater percentages of black
residents or poor residents participate at equal or greater rates than others. 68
Significantly, the most important predictor of beat attendance rates is the
level of crime in a neighborhood, with citizens in high-crime neighborhoods
62 See, e.g., Stephen D. Mastrofski, Community Policing as Reform: A Cautionary Tale,
in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY, supra note 18, at 47, 51 (Neighborhood
organizations "are not a microcosm of the neighborhoods they are alleged to represent.
They, like all social institutions, are heavily influenced by the distribution of power, status,
and wealth within their domain.").
63 SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 9, at 139, 147, 239.
64 SKOGAN, supra note 59, at 106-09.
65 Id. at 109.
66 FUNG, supra note 28, at 75.
67 Id.
68 Wesley Skogan examines data from 1998 and finds that attendance was higher in
predominately black neighborhoods than in predominately white ones, and higher in low-
income areas than wealthier ones. WESLEY SKOGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT: COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO 20-22 (2000). Archon Fung takes data
from 1995 and 1997 and finds that a neighborhood's percentage of black or Hispanic
residents, like its income level, had no statistically significant impact on beat meeting
attendance rates. FUNG, supra note 28, at 109-11.
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being the most likely to attend meetings. 69 These findings run contrary to
those of earlier community policing studies.70 They also contradict the
notion that individuals in disadvantaged neighborhoods lack either the
resources or the desire to participate in local democratic institutions.
Chicago's success at securing participation from historically
disconnected groups raises important questions, which I will return to in
Section IV. For present purposes, though, there is one less hopeful result
from Chicago. As with other community policing efforts, younger Chicago
residents are still less likely to attend beat meetings or sit on District
advisory committees. In practice, most residents who attend beat meetings
are middle aged and older.71 The same holds true with the District advisory
committees.72 The absence of the young has, at times, undermined the
effectiveness of local community policing initiatives. In one Chicago
neighborhood, for example, citizens organized anti-drug marches, but their
efforts were short-lived and ineffective. Residents themselves cited the
absence of youth involvement as among the reasons for the failure.73
Another reason the absence of young people matters is that their satisfaction
with the police differs from older residents. For example, seventy-four
percent of Chicago residents over sixty-five reported that, on average, the
police were doing a good job. By contrast, only forty-five percent of those
69 FUNG, supra note 28, at 109-11; SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 20.
70 At the same time, other aspects of the Chicago findings confirm earlier research
showing that class can influence participation rates. For example, within individual beats,
home owners were significantly more likely to attend meetings than non-homeowners.
Wesley G. Skogan, Representing the Community in Community Policing, in COMMUNITY
POLICING: CAN IT WORK?, supra note 2, at 57, 60. Residents with more education also were
more likely to attend beat meetings; for example, in beats where thirty percent of the
residents were college educated, seventy-five percent of participants reported having a
college degree. Id. at 62. Race also played an influence: although beats with greater
numbers of blacks had participation rates as high or higher as other beats, Latino
participation remained low, except in beats where Latinos were a large majority of the
residents. Id. Finally, beat meeting attendance was unrepresentative in one other important
respect. Those who attended beat meetings typically were more likely than their non-
attending neighbors to be satisfied with the quality of police services in the neighborhood.
Id. at 67. Interestingly, what Skogan calls the "optimism gap" is particularly large for
African-Americans. Fifty-nine percent of blacks who attended meetings were satisfied with
the police, while only forty-two percent of non-attenders were satisfied, a seventeen percent
difference. Id. at 68-69. For whites, the gap was only nine percent and for Latinos it was
fourteen percent. Id. Unfortunately, the design of this particular research project does not
allow us to know the direction of the causation arrow. Namely, are satisfied neighbors more
likely to attend meetings, or does meeting attendance produce satisfaction?
71 SKOGAN & HARTNETT, supra note 9, at 114.
72 Id. at 149.




under the age of thirty felt the same way.
The Chicago research documents that youth and young adults do not
attend community policing meetings or participate in other official activity.
But another way to measure community policing's effectiveness is to look
at more informal police-citizen contacts-in neighborhoods, stores, and on
street corners. 75 The absence of these informal contacts between police and
inner-city young people has long been of concern, and was documented by
the Kerner Commission over forty years ago. After surveying beat officers
regarding who they talked to, the Commission concluded that officers were
likely to know store-keepers and shop-owners by name, but were detached
from neighborhood young people.76
These informal contacts matter to community policing, because they
are one way for officers to learn citizen perceptions of neighborhood
problems. They also are important to fighting crime and disorder, for they
are part of how police learn about who is doing what, and who can be relied
on.77 Especially in light of the substantial evidence that police perceive
minority youth as hostile and threatening, 78 it is critical that the police have
the sort of individualized information that lessens their need to rely on
group stereotypes.
The available research, however, suggests that the same age disparities
74 Skogan, supra note 70, at 69. Age disparities regarding police satisfaction raise (but
do not answer) questions about the argument that inner-city elders and young people share a
'linked fate,' so that burdens imposed on younger people are borne by a community's elders.
See Kahan & Meares, supra note 33, at 1176 ("The pervasive sense of 'linked fate' between
the majority of inner-city residents and the youths affected by curfews and gang-loitering
ordinances furnishes a compelling reason not to second-guess the community's
determination that such measures enhance rather than detract from liberty in their
communities."). I am not suggesting that the linked fate argument does not have force;
indeed, I think it does. Rather I believe that more research is in order to clarify areas where
the link exists, where it does not, and precisely how it operates. Further, it is worth pointing
out that age differences do not always cut in predictable ways. For example, older Chicago
residents actually tended to see fewer crime problems than younger ones. Young people
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine were twice as likely as those over sixty-five to
say that street crime was a big problem in their neighborhood. Skogan, supra note 70, at 65.
The disparity was almost as wide for burglary. Id.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 18-26, where I argue that these informal contacts,
while important, are not a substitute for formal, deliberative meetings between police and
neighborhood residents.
76 Groves, supra note 10, at 112.
77 This point is compellingly made in a variety of police ethnographies. For example, see
Chapter 5 of JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973).
78 John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Criminal Inequality in America: Patterns and




that mark participation rates in the formal arenas also exist in the informal
ones. Roger Parks and his colleagues studied community policing in St.
Petersburg and Indianapolis, with a particular focus on how patrol officers
and community policing specialists chose to spend their time. Their
findings were not dissimilar to the Kerner Commission's: they found that
community policing specialists were less likely to initiate contact with
young people (defined as under twenty-nine), and were more likely to
initiate contact with those who represent organizations-including local
business, government or not-for-profit agencies, and neighborhood
groups.
79
These findings led Parks to conclude that
[cjommunity policing specialists, largely freed of responsibility to respond to radio
calls and empowered to select members of the public whom they would encounter,
were more likely than patrol generalists to engage "good citizens," persons whose
social status or immediate circumstances remove them from that class of people and
conditions which contribute to the "tainted" character of police work.
80
These finding echoes the Houston officer who told James Wilson and
George Kelling that he liked community policing because, "[t]raditionally,
police officers after about three years get to thinking everybody's a loser.
That's the only people you're dealing with. In community policing you're
dealing with the good citizens, helping them solve problems. 81  The St.
Petersburg and Indianapolis findings suggest that people under the age
twenty-nine were disproportionately not "good citizens" with whom these
officers sought contact.
B. POLICING YOUTH: PRACTICE
Not only are inner-city young people absent from community
policing's agenda-setting forums, they are still generally policed as they had
been under the warrior model-as threats to public order. Age persists as
one of the most reliable variables indicating a likelihood of negative
interaction with police. As I have mentioned, when they are stopped by
police, the young are (statistically significantly) more likely to be both
disrespected82 and illegally searched.83 Similarly, a recent study of police
use of force found that officers were (statistically significantly) more likely
79 Roger Parks et al., How Officers Spend Their Time With The Community, 16 JUST. Q.
483, 514 (1999).
80 id.
81 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1989, at 46, 52.
82 Mastrofski et al., supra note 50, at 532, 539.




to use force on males, nonwhites, the young, and the poor.
These statistical studies echo what other researchers have observed.
For example, William Chambliss' observational research with Washington,
D.C.'s Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) caused him to conclude:
The RDU patrols the ghetto continuously looking for cars with young black men in
them. They are especially attentive to newer-model cars.., based on the belief that
they are the favorite cars of drug dealers. During our observations, however, the RDU
officers came to the conclusion that drug dealers were leaving their fancy cars at home
to avoid vehicular stops. It thus became commonplace for RDU officers to stop any
car with young black men in it. 85
One of the officers with whom Chambliss talked explained such tactics:
"This is the jungle.... We rewrite the constitution every day down
here.... If we pull everyone over they will eventually learn that we aren't





Despite my familiarity with the empirical and anecdotal evidence, I
87
was nonetheless shocked to personally confront similar police practices.
A charter high-school that I helped to start, called the Maya Angelou
School, is located in a neighborhood, and on a comer, long known for
substantial drug activity.88 During the spring of 2001, for reasons that
neither the students, staff, nor I were ever to learn, police became
particularly active on our comer.
Neither I nor any of the teachers were ever stopped. Our kids, on
break between classes, were not so lucky. On numerous occasions, officers
arrived at the comer in front of the school, threw students against the wall,
and searched them. These searches were not polite encounters. Teens were
forced to spread their legs, faces against the school wall or a squad car,
hands behind their heads. They were then searched by officers, who felt
84 William Terrill & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Situational and Officer-Based Determinants
of Police Coercion, 19 JUST. Q. 215, 236 (2002).
85 William Chambliss, Policing the Ghetto Underclass: The Politics of Law and Law
Enforcement, 41 Soc. PROBS. 177, 179 (1994).
86 id.
87 1 relate these incidents and student reactions to them in greater detail in James Forman,
Jr., Children, Cops, and Citizenship: Why Conservatives Should Oppose Racial Profiling, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 150
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
88 The Maya Angelou Public Charter School was founded in 1997, and today serves 185
students, many of whom had not succeeded in traditional schools. For more detail about the
school, see James Forman, Jr., Foreword, Separate but Unequal: The Status of America's




every area of their body. At no point during these searches did the officers
recover any drugs, and none of the students was found in violation of the
law as a result of the stops.
This was not a neighborhood with community policing; beat officers
did not attend regular meetings with area citizens. 89 Nonetheless, school
staff did their best to raise the issue with the local precinct. It was
remarkably difficult to find any officer or supervisor who would claim
responsibility for this comer, and the staff who tried remained pessimistic
that their complaints ever got through. Their worst fears were realized a
few weeks later when another officer chased one of our male students into
the school, wrestled him to the ground, and searched him. Staff later found
out that the officer explained his actions by claiming that he "knew this kid"
and believed he was bad, likely carrying drugs. No drugs were found.
Two weeks later, after one of our students refused to leave the comer
in front of our school (the student was in compliance with school rules and
D.C. law, taking a short break between classes), an officer grabbed the
student and began to arrest him and place him into a police van. Only after
a staff person came outside did the officer let the student go. As
demoralizing as these police actions were individually and collectively for
students, I was struck then (and still am) by what the students wanted in
response: they did not want to sue, and they were not especially interested
in the quasi-adjudicative citizen complaint review process. They wanted to
talk to the officers and a supervisor, and to do so quickly, in the hope that
the searches would stop.90
C. POLICING YOUTH: RHETORIC
The warrior model in practice has been accompanied by rhetoric
regarding the inner-city young which portrays them exclusively as threats to
order. Consider James Q. Wilson and George Kelling-in discussing
sources of fear in inner-city neighborhoods, they argue that, "law-abiding
citizens who are afraid to go onto streets filled with graffiti, winos, and
loitering youths yield control of these streets to people who are not
frightened by these signs of urban decay." 91
There are two features of this formulation that are important to note.
First, in juxtaposing "law-abiding citizens" with "loitering youths," Wilson
89 For a discussion of the Chicago CAPS program, which operates in this fashion, see
supra text accompanying notes 21-27 and infra Part IV.
90 For a discussion of how community policing might provide a framework for such a
conversation, see infra Part IV.
91 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 81, at 48.
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and Kelling define the youth as not law abiding. Indeed, their presence is a
sign of "decay." Second, in juxtaposing "afraid" citizens with "loitering
youth," the authors define the young people themselves as not "afraid," and
presumably, therefore, not interested in improving public safety.
My point is not to single out Wilson or Kelling. Their description of
youth as threats, not assets, is typical. For Sykes, for example, youth
appear only as "youthful male 'trouble-makers"' who "loiter on street
corners, harass elderly citizens, intimidate passersby and generally add to
the fear and uncertainty of urban life ....,92 For these young people, he
concludes, "the police become the only institution available for remedy."
93
Skogan, for his part, writes of "congregating bands of youth" who violate
"widely approved standards of public conduct. 94
In one sense, it should not come as a surprise that the young are
defined as hostile enemies, hardly likely to be co-producers of public safety.
Recall the warrior model of policing: in it, the entire inner city is defined in
such a manner. Yet this view of the young as threats was being elaborated
at precisely the same time as many (including some of the same authors)
were finally beginning to reject that vision of the inner city as a whole.
Why are young people in the inner city still largely viewed as threats when
the rest of the inner city is, at least in part, beginning to overcome that
stigma?95
Has the inner-city minority community writ large been rescued from
its historical association with criminality by identifying an even more
marginal sub-group on which to pin the blame? That view would garner
some support from Tim Hope's suggestion that modem community crime
control programs require an outsider, against whom community members
can mobilize in defense. 96 Perhaps the young have become such outsiders,
but I suggest we consider another possibility as well, one that is attentive to
92 Gary W. Sykes, Street Justice: A Moral Defense of Order Maintenance Policing, 3
JUST. Q. 497, 506-07 (1986).
93 Id.
94 SKOGAN, supra note 59, at 2.
95 One response to this question is the straightforward proposition that youth commit a
disproportionate share of crime. I discuss this issue, and its implications, in Section III.A.
Another response, which is beyond the scope of this article to address, would be that
Americans have a deep-seated investment in demonizing inner-city young black men. See,
e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315 (2004) (describing historical creation and
perpetuation of belief in black male criminality).
96 Tim Hope, Community Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER SOCIETY: STRATEGIC




the particular historical context in which community policing gained
traction.
Community policing's growth in the early 1990s occurred alongside a
dramatic rise in homicides committed by those between the ages of sixteen
and twenty-four. 97  Moreover, demographic data indicated that this age
cohort was growing in size. The combination of more young people, and
more violent young people, gave rise to predictions that crime by the young
would increase at even greater rates in the early twenty-first century. The
Justice Department, for example, predicted that the number of juvenile
arrests for violent crimes would double between 1992 and 2010.98
Criminologist James Alan Fox warned that "[w]e are facing a potential
bloodbath of teenage violence in years ahead that will be so bad, we'll look
back at the 1990s and say those were the good old days." 99 In an article
entitled Why Kids Are Ruining America, author Bret Easton Ellis argued
that
things have changed drastically in the last 20 years, to the point where one can only
really chuckle in grim disbelief. Cheating on exams? Smoking cigarettes?
Shoplifting? You wish. Murder, rape, robbery, vandalism: the overwhelming
majority of these crimes are committed by people under 25, and the rate is escalating
rapidly.' 00
Some criminologists cast doubt on these predictions.' 0 In fact, crime
by the young began to decline precipitously in 1994.102 Yet that news was
largely lost against the backdrop of the "super-predators" theme that had
already captured America's attention. 10 3  William Bennett, John Dilulio,
and John Walters argued that "today's bad boys are far worse than
yesteryear's and tomorrow's will be even worse than today's."' 4 As a
result, they said, "America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile
'super-predators'-radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters,
97 Alfred Blumstein, Violence by Young People: Why the Deadly Nexus?, NAT'L INST.
JUST. J., Aug. 1995, at 3.
98 Howard N. Snyder et al., Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1996 Update on Violence,
JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), 1997, at 5.
99 Melissa Rossi, Why Kids Are Running America, GEORGE MAG., June/July 1996, at 98.
100 Bret Easton Ellis, Why Kids Are Ruining America, GEORGE MAG., June/July 1996, at
97.
'0' Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 27, 28, 52 (1998).
102 Howard N. Snyder, Juvenile Arrests 2001, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention), Dec. 2003, at 1.
103 Id. at 52.
104 WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY ... AND How To WIN
AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26-27 (1996).
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including ever more preteenage boys, who murder, assault, rob, burglarize,
deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and create serious communal
disorders."'
0 5
These themes also loomed large in mass media coverage, with national
magazines running stories such as Now for the Bad News: A Teenage
Timebomb, 10 6 Children Without Pity,10 7 and A Generation of Stone
Killers.10 8 Indeed, even as crime began to decline, media coverage of crime
increased. 10 9 This finding is especially important given that most people's
opinions about crime come from what they see or read in the news, rather
than from their own personal experience. 110 Given such media focus, it is
not surprising that most people believed that youth crime was rising even
when it was declining."'
Some have argued that the fervor surrounding the threat of violence by
the young during this era amounted to a "moral panic"-a period in which a
publicized incident or series of incidents triggers an intense community
reaction, an exaggerated sense of threat, and collective hostility toward the
offenders. 1 2 Whatever the name assigned, I would suggest that this was a
particularly inopportune historical moment to expect that the public, police,
or policy-makers would be likely to embrace a vision of policing that
emphasized young people as assets to public order.
III. YOUTH AS ASSETS TO COMMUNITY POLICING: WHAT'S AT STAKE?
To this point, I have suggested (in Section I) that community
policing has potential both to mobilize residents toward community crime
prevention and to regulate police conduct. I have specifically argued that
105 Id. at 27.
106 Richard Zoglin, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Timebomb, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at
52.
107 Nancy Traver, Children Without Pity, TIME, Oct. 26, 1992, at 46.
108 Scott Minerbrook, A Generation of Stone Killers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 17,
1994, at 33.
109 LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE AND CRIME IN
THE NEWS 10 (2001), available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.html.
1i0 Id. at 4 (seventy-six percent of the public say they form their opinions about crime
from the media and twenty-two percent base them on personal experience); see also
Emestine S. Gray, The Media-Don't Believe the Hype, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 45, 48-49
(2003) (collecting polling data).
"l DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 109, at 3-4. For a thoughtful discussion of how
violent crime on local news can exacerbate implicit racial bias, see Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).




community policing has greater potential for regulating the police than does
the model of judicial enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. At the same
time, I have outlined (in Section II) that inner-city young people are still
policed under the pre-community policing warrior model. I concluded
Section II by outlining some assumptions we make about the young that I
believe perpetuate the warrior model's continued application to this group.
In Section III.A, I will turn to evidence suggesting that our existing
assumptions are wrong, and argue that we have every reason to believe that
inner-city young people can be assets to the community policing project.
Further, in Section III.B, I will explore why it is so urgent that law
enforcement engage in this project. There is a values battle underway in
inner-city areas, and law enforcement currently is on the wrong side.
Finally, in Section III.C, I will suggest that this need not be the case, and I
will discuss how law enforcement can be in the business of strengthening
the legitimacy of its own authority.
A. THE SILENT MAJORITY
But what of the reality that young people are disproportionately likely
to commit crimes? Youth is correlated with offending to such a great extent
that criminologists refer to an "age-crime curve." The teens and early to
mid-twenties are the prime offending years for most violent crimes, and the
tendency to commit crime declines as people get older.
1 13
This fact may not tell us as much as it might appear, however. We
must first consider, of course, that the existence of an age-crime curve tells
us very little about the likelihood that a particular young person is a
criminal. Consider my earlier example of the searches at the Maya Angelou
School. Imagine three black males-a student aged seventeen, a graduate
aged twenty-three, and a teacher aged fifty-all standing in front of the
school. Knowing nothing else, it would be reasonable to assume that the
seventeen and twenty-three year-olds were more likely than the fifty year
old to, say, be selling drugs. But for purposes of this discussion, that is not
what matters. Instead, what is important is that the seventeen and twenty-
three year-olds are much more likely not to be selling drugs than to be
doing so. 1
14
113 See Blumstein, supra note 97, at 3; Cook & Laub, supra note 101, at 35-37.
114 My argument here finds analogy in the racial profiling literature, where many have
pointed out that although blacks are arrested for a disproportionate amount of crime, the
overwhelming majority of black citizens are never arrested for a crime. COLE, supra note 4,
at 42; DAvID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 106
(2002); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 791-92 (1994). This argument should
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As it turns out, despite the existence of an age-crime curve, the
majority of criminal activity is concentrated among a small portion of the
young. This was first documented in Marvin Wolfgang's landmark study,
Delinquency in a Birth Cohort.115 Wolfgang tracked 10,000 Philadelphia
boys through childhood, adolescence and into adulthood. He found that a
small group of boys committed the majority of serious and violent juvenile
crime. Chronic offenders constituted six percent of the cohort, but were
responsible for fifty-one percent of all offenses and about two-thirds of all
violent crime. In a study of a second Philadelphia birth cohort, researchers
found that seven percent of the boys committed sixty-one percent of
homicides, seventy-five percent of rapes, seventy-three percent of
robberies, and sixty-five percent of all aggravated assaults. 16 Subsequent
studies have confirmed these original findings.' 1 7 For drug offenses, for
example, less than five percent of youth commit seventy-five percent of
sales. 18 A related line of research has found that although many violent
juvenile offenders live in high-risk neighborhood, "the majority of youth
who live in such environments are not involved in serious delinquency."' 19
In addition to the fact that offending is highly concentrated among a
be distinguished from two related arguments common to the racial profiling debate: (1) that
the costs of racial profiling outweigh its benefits (I make a form of this argument infra note
147), and (2) that racial profiling is wrong because it is immoral or unconstitutional,
regardless of whether it works. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 4, at 42 ("[Olur nation's
historical reliance on race for invidious discrimination renders suspect such consideration of
race today, even if it might be 'rational' in some sense."); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME
AND THE LAW 146-47 (1997) (Even "[ilf taking race into account in making determinations
of suspicion is a rational adaptation to the racial demographics of criminality," courts should
carefully scrutinize police use of race because "[r]ace is different" and "the making of racial
distinctions has proved to be more destructive and more popularly distasteful than other lines
of social stratification."); Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 27
AMERASIA J. 43, 49 (2002) (Even if a particular racial profiling policy can be justified on
utilitarian grounds, "aren't moral principles embedded in our Constitution supposed to trump
utilitarian calculations?").
115 MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972).
116 PAUL E. TRACY ET AL., DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN Two BIRTH COHORTS 280 (1990).
117 SERIOUS & VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL
INTERVENTIONS 25-28 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 1998) (summarizing
studies); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the
Passage to Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 744-45 (2002).
118 Johnson et al., Concentration of Delinquent Offending: Serious Drug Involvement and
High Delinquency Rates, 21 J. DRUG ISSUES 205, 206, 222 (1991).
119 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON JUVENILE VIOLENCE RESEARCH 9 (1999); see also Steven D. Levitt & Lance Lochner, The
Determinants of Juvenile Crime 13 (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(self-report data indicating that seventy-four percent of males ages 15-19 do not report a
major violent or property crime).
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few offenders, there is yet another reason to see the law-abiding majority as
potential assets to community policing's public safety project. Polling data
suggests that both public safety and police conduct are issues that matter to
the young. Chicago residents aged eighteen to twenty-nine were more
likely than older residents to say that street crime and burglaries were big
problems in their neighborhood. 120  In Between Hope and Fear, a 1995
survey, almost half of urban African-American students, and seventy-two
percent of those who live in neighborhoods defined as at-risk, reported that
they or their friends had been "hassled by the police when [they] weren't
doing anything wrong.' 21 In a 1999 survey, two-thirds of youth said that
they felt their streets were "dangerous" and "full of gangs. ' 22 Half said
they therefore curtailed activities. 123  Between Hope and Fear reached
similar conclusions: forty-four percent of all urban students, and sixty-two
percent of African-American urban students, said that neighborhood crime
was a serious problem.
124
In line with these results are findings that the majority of inner-city
youth hold lawbreakers in low regard. For example, in a Washington, D.C.
survey eighty-two percent said that they "did not at all admire" a person
who sold drugs. 12 5  Similarly, seventy-eight percent of urban African-
American teens characterized gangs as "violent and destructive."'1 26
These attitudes about crime are not surprising when we consider that
teens and young adults are the group most at risk of criminal victimization
(including crime by their age peers, as well as by those older than them). 27
These victimization levels provide some reason to suspect that some young
people would consider participating in a community policing program.
Recall that Chicago's current community policing initiative sees highest
120 See supra note 74.
121 THE NATIONAL TEENS, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY PROGRAM, BETWEEN HOPE AND
FEAR: TEENS SPEAK OUT ON CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 97 (1995) [hereinafter BETWEEN
HOPE AND FEAR]; see also infra text accompanying notes 151-54 for a discussion of how
younger citizens are more likely to believe they have been victims of racial profiling.
IN Karen Pittman, Youth Engagement, 8 YOUTH TODAY 55, 55 (1999).
123 Id.
124 BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR, supra note 121, at 32.
125 PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY FROM CRIME: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG
DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 82-83 (1990).
126 BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR, supra note 121, at 103.
127 DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 109, at 22; Regina Austin, "The Black
Community, " Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769,
1781 (1992); see also Joy D. Osofsky, Addressing Youth Victimization 2 (Office of Juvenile




participation rates in neighborhoods with the most violent crime.' 28 This
finding suggests that the desire to achieve personal and community safety is
sufficiently powerful to generate participation even among groups that are
disproportionately disengaged. 1
29
B. THE VALUES BATTLE
By this point, many readers will have identified a tension in my
argument. On the one hand, I have just argued that many of the inner-city
young are law-abiding citizens, disproportionately victimized by crime, and
for that reason potential allies in a project to ensure community safety. 3 °
On the other hand, I have suggested already-and will do so more
forcefully in the pages to follow-that current police practices toward
inner-city youth engender hostility and alienation that undermines
community order. I embrace this tension; indeed, in many respects, its
existence is the heart of my argument. As I explore in this Section, young
people in the inner-city communities operate in a complicated world of
competing values and conflicting norms. "Decent" and "street" attitudes
and behaviors co-exist within the same neighborhood, and often, within the
same person.13' But my claim is that the presence of these conflicting
attitudes-some of which are hostile to law enforcement-does not mean
than an effective community policing relationship cannot be reached.
Instead, it makes the need for such more urgent.
Elijah Anderson's research suggests that "street" and "decent" values
are in tension within a neighborhood. As Anderson argues, "in underclass
communities, conventionality and the street culture wage a constant battle
for the hearts and minds of the younger residents, and this dichotomy has
128 See supra text accompanying notes 68-69 and infra text accompanying note 175.
129 See SKOGAN ET AL., supra note 68, at 22. The evidence that younger people are less
likely to be civically engaged is substantial. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REvIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 247-48 (2000). There is one piece of
data that cuts the other way: the 1990s saw a substantial increase in volunteering and
community service by young people. Id. at 265.
130 See supra Part III.A.
131 The terms "decent" and "street" come from sociologist Elijah Anderson. For
Anderson, characteristics of decent families include hard work, thrift, self-sacrifice,
politeness, a consideration for neighbors' well-being, a focus on child-rearing and
educational success for children, and acceptance of mainstream culture and values.
Characteristics of street families include disorganized lives, lack of consideration for others,
a superficial sense of family and community, idleness, incivility, the inability to remain
committed to a job, a willingness to resort to violence to settle disputes, inattention to the
demands of child-rearing, and a rejection of mainstream culture and values. ANDERSON,
supra note 5, at 35-65.
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become an organizing principle. 132 Moreover, those who work in or study
inner-city communities know that this tension can exist within the same
individual.1 33 In the words of the principal for the high school serving
Chicago's Robert Taylor housing project, "folks think you got good and
bad around here, but you got good and bad in the same person. That's what
you see if you stay around here long enough."'134 Or, as the director of a
program for inner-city youth explains, many teens are "walking the fence
and could fall on either side."'
' 35
Even many gang members, the group we might reasonably assume had
most rejected conventionality, indicate being torn between a street and a
decent orientation. 136 For example, John Hagedorn found that there were
four types of members among the Milwaukee gangs he studied. 137 First,
were the "new jacks," the most committed to the gang life style, who
viewed the drug business as a career. At the other end of the spectrum were
"legits," who over the course of their adolescence and young adulthood left
gang life and adopted legitimate lifestyles. The third category was "dope
fiends," who were addicted to drugs and were involved in drug selling as a
way to sustain their habit. The final group was "homeboys," who alternated
between conventional jobs and drug selling. Hagedorn found that
homeboys were the majority of Milwaukee gang members. They tended to
be unskilled, insufficiently educated, and had met with limited success in
the conventional labor market. They were not committed to a gang
lifestyle, nor were they committed to conventionality. Instead, they moved
back and forth between legal work and drug selling. 13
8
Homeboys by and large expressed "conventional aspirations; their core
values centered on finding a secure place in the American way of life."' 139
Many clung to the dream of settling down and leading legitimate lifestyles,
132 Id. at 287.
133 ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 153, 237-289; DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE
OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA 149-51 (2004).
134 SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN
GHETTO 175 (2000).
135 MILBREY MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., URBAN SANCTUARIES: NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZA-
TIONS IN THE LIVES AND FUTURES OF INNER-CITY YOUTH 96 (1994).
136 FELIX M. PADILLA, THE GANG AS AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 157 (1992); JAMES
SHORT & FRED STRODBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND GANG DELINQUENCY (1965); Jeffrey
Fagan, The Social Organization of Drug Use and Drug Dealing Among Urban Gangs, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 633 (1989).
137 John M. Hagedom, Homeboys, Dope Fiends, Legits, and New Jacks, 32
CRIMINOLOGY 197 (1994) [hereinafter Homeboys, Dope Fiends]; John M. Hagedom,
Homeboys, New Jacks, andAnomie, 3 J. AFR. AM. MEN 7 (1997).
138 Hagedorn, Homeboys, Dope Fiends, supra note 137, at 207-11.
9 id. at 209.
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despite their inability to achieve it. In the words of one, when asked what
he would like to be doing five years in the future: "I want to have a steady
job, I want to have been working that job for about five years, and just with
a family somewhere."'' 40  Another explained his similarly conventional
aspirations:
Because I see a lot of brothers out here now, that's forty-three, forty-four and ain't got
shit. They's still standing out on the comer trying to make a hustle. Doing this, no
family, no stable home and nothing. I don't want that shit.... I don't give a fuck
about getting rich or nothing, but I want a comfortable life, a decent woman, a family
to come home to.14
Bobby, a student I taught at the Maya Angelou School, expressed the
difficult challenge that many inner-city teens face as they attempt to
straddle the line between delinquency and conventionality. In an interview
for a documentary about the school, Bobby was asked about his ability to
abandon his former life of intermittent delinquency, and instead commit to
school and work:
My past life.., has affected me a lot. It's got me in a confused little world.... Am I
going to be an ignorant fool all my life, am I going to do all the bad shit that I can, or
am I going to just try to do something with my life, to make it? It's like one or the
other, one or the other. You can't do both. You can, but, it'll be harder. You gotta do
one or the other, which one would you pick? Right now I'm trying to pick the good
thing. It's easy to pick the bad thing, that's the easy way out.142
A variety of forces in the inner city operates against this backdrop and tries
to influence values, attitudes, and behaviors. This includes, on one side,
teachers, counselors, church leaders, and others, who typically attempt to
persuade young people to remain committed to decency. Against this group
is arrayed a variety of anti social forces pressuring young people to choose
crime and other irresponsible options.
As the most prominent representative of state authority in the lives of
inner-city teens, 143 the police necessarily have the potential to influence
this debate as well, for their actions can influence attitudes in a number of
directions. Prevailing police practices in the inner city-such as gang
loitering ordinances, order maintenance policing, and crackdowns on street-
140 Id.
141 Id. at 210.
142 INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY (Big Mouth Productions 1997).
143 See, e.g, Paul G. Chevigny, Foreword to ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE
NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY vii (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001)
("For a great many people-the poor and the dispossessed, the minorities, immigrants, and
the thousands of others who are victims of crime, violators of city ordinances, as well as
perpetrators of crime-the police are the cutting edge of government.").
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level drug dealing-continue to reinforce norms of opposition. 144
This is clearest in the context of gang loitering ordinances, which
authorize police to order the dispersal of those who appear to be gang
members, and those who are with them. Such measures have been cited as
reinforcing norms of law-abidingness among inner-city youth.145 Yet there
is reason to question this. The social norms argument for gang-loitering
laws goes as follows: (1) teens in high-gang neighborhoods do not value
gang membership but mistakenly believe that their peers do, and they
therefore feel compelled to join gangs; and (2) the best way to attack the
misperception that others value gang membership is to restrict the ability of
gangs to operate visibly in a neighborhood. 146 There is undoubtedly some
truth to both these premises. But the argument understates the costs of gang
loitering ordinances. If police orders to disperse are perceived as arbitrary
by neighborhood teens, or if such orders are understood to be
manifestations of an approach to policing that treats youth as threats, then a
willingness to defy such orders will be interpreted as a sign of strength.
This will in turn raise the status of gang members in the eyes of other
neighborhood youth, and reinforce hostility toward law enforcement. 
147
Support for such a view comes from gang researchers themselves, who
have long suggested that police practices, particularly those that are
perceived as biased, can in fact strengthen gangs. 148 Bill, a Milwaukee gang
member, explained how police anti gang tactics had driven him toward a
gang identity:
Bill: [W]hat got me into the gangs was SH (a gang squad officer).
Interviewer: Why do you say that?
Bill: OK. I would be walking with (two of my friends) and he says, "Oh three [gang
members], huh." I told him, "Man, I ain't gang-related, man." And he goes, "Oh,
who you walk with is who you are.
' 149
While such tactics may have short-term benefits, over the longer term
hostility toward police will rise, causing police to adopt yet harsher tactics,
144 Cole, supra note 31, at 1091 (emphasizing extent to which discriminatory policing
can "reinforce social norms that are antithetical to the law").
145 See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, supra note 19, at 819-21.
146 Id.
147 As I indicated supra note 114, this form of utilitarian argument against gang loitering
ordinances is similar to the arguments commonly advanced against racial profiling more
generally. See, e.g., KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 44-46 (1998)
(emphasizing costs of racial profiling).
148 JOHN HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND THE UNDERCLASS IN A
RUSTBELT CITY 160 (1988) ("[W]e should not underestimate the effect police policies play
in strengthening and forming gang identities."); VENKATESH, supra note 134, at 163.
149 HAGEDORN, supra note 148, at 159.
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which in turn will increase hostility and reduce cooperation further.' 50
But even in jurisdictions without gang loitering ordinances, the
aggressive stop and frisk practices I described earlier can have a similar
impact. Consider Lee, one of the inner-city young men Elijah Anderson
studied. Lee exhibits "decent" values. He gets good grades and is planning
to attend community college. But he dresses like most young men in the
neighborhood, some of whom are more street-oriented.
When the police cruise his drug-infested neighborhood and see him in
his Timberland boots, his striped shirt, and his hooded sweatshirt, they stop
him and ask him where his drugs are, and this makes him bitter. The
knowledge that the wider system in the person of cops, teachers, and store
managers downtown is instantly ready to lump them with the street element
takes a psychological toll on boys like Lee.15
The psychological toll about which Anderson speaks includes
increased resentment of the police themselves. For example, in a study of
Washington, D.C. neighborhoods, forty percent of blacks said they believed
they had been stopped by the police on the basis of their race or ethnicity.1
52
Yet the proportion is dramatically higher among black men between the
ages of eighteen to thirty-four-seventy-three percent of this group believes
it has been victimized by racial profiling at least once. 53  Moreover,
personal experience is a strong predictor of attitudes toward the police.
Those who believe they were stopped because of their race are significantly
more likely to be dissatisfied with police and to believe that racial profiling
is widespread. 5 4  Not surprisingly, then, younger respondents hold the
police in a less favorable light than do older ones. 55
150 Kahan, supra note 3, at 1529-30 (elaborating downsides to order maintenance
policing).
151 ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 104.
152 Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and
Personal Experience, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 443 (2002).
153 Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 15, at 1249-50 (younger blacks are more likely to
believe that police are "gang-like").
154 Wietzer & Tuch, supra note 152, at 449.
155 Id. at 448. Weitzer's project contains a wealth of provocative findings. In a related
paper, Weitzer examines attitudes about policing in a middle-class white neighborhood, a
middle-class black neighborhood, and a lower-class black neighborhood. See Ronald
Weitzer, Citzens' Perceptions of Police Misconduct: Race and Neighborhood Context, 16
JUST. Q. 819 (1999). He generally finds that class matters more than race. He finds greater
similarity in attitudes between the two middle-class neighborhoods than he does between the
two black neighborhoods of different classes. Id. at 830-31, 834-39. For another discussion
of the ways in which race and class influence perceptions of the police and the legal system,
see Brooks, supra note 15, at 1250-51, who finds that while better-off blacks are more
distrustful of the legal system generally than poorer blacks, poorer blacks are more
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The resentment, in turn, has costs for community safety. The most
immediate is the reluctance of many in poor and minority communities to
participate in police investigations. Imagine that you are eighteen, standing
outside of your school during a break from class. For no reason (that you
can discern or is ever explained to you), squad cars pull up, officers come
out shouting, guns drawn, and you are thrown up against the wall, elbowed
in the back, legs kicked apart, and violently searched. Your books are
strewn on the ground. You ask what's going on and are told to "shut the
fuck up" or you will be taken downtown. When it finally ends, the officers
leave, no apology, no explanation, and you are left to fix your clothes, pick
up your books, and gather your pride. Now imagine that there is a crime in
your neighborhood, about which you have heard a rumor. The police are
looking for information. What are the chances you will cooperate?
156
Not only does this type of policing make it harder to gather
information, it also reinforces the alienation of youth like Lee-repeated
over time, it can cause youth who are straddling the line between
delinquency and law-abidingness to think of themselves as delinquent.' 57 In
so doing, the police undermine the message of those who are trying to push
youth towards conventionality, and reinforce the cause of those who are
pushing youth toward opposition.
C. WHY POLICING MATTERS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Many who have examined police practices in the inner city have
argued that they can undermine the law's legitimacy in the eyes of the
distrustful of the police.
156 Forman, supra note 87, at 158-59; see also KENNEDY, supra note 114, at 153
(identifying toll that hostile police-community relations take on police information gathering
ability); Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 579, 590
(1997) ("The mutual distrust between African Americans and law enforcement officers
makes it less likely that African Americans will report crimes to the police, assist the police
in criminal investigations, and participate in community policing programs that lead to
greater social control of neighborhoods.").
157 ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 312-13:
The extent to which some children-particularly those who through upbringing have become
most alienated and those who lack strong and conventional social support-experience, feel, and
internalize racist rejection and contempt from mainstream society may strongly encourage them
to express contempt for that society in return. In dealing with this contempt and rejection, some
youngsters consciously invest themselves and their considerable mental resources in what
amounts to an oppositional culture, a part of which is the code of the streets. They do so to
preserve themselves and their own self-respect. Once they do, any respect they might be able to
gamer in the wider system pales in comparison with the respect available in the local system,
thus they often lose interest in even attempting to negotiate the mainstream system.
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policed. 158 There is now a growing body of social psychology research
validating these concerns. Tom Tyler and others have shown that people's
evaluation of the legitimacy of police and courts is based on their sense of
whether authority has acted fairly. 159 The most counter-intuitive part of the
findings is that people's assessment of the fairness of decisions is based
principally on the process of decision-making, rather than on whether they
received a favorable outcome. 160 For example, the bulk of citizens do not
object to being stopped in their cars or on the streets if those stops "are
handled in interpersonally sensitive ways."'161 Similarly, among other
measures of procedural justice, citizens care a great deal about voice and
representation-they want the chance to have their views heard before a
decision-maker who renders judgment (including the decision whether to
cite or arrest the citizen). 162 The other critical finding from this literature is
that people's assessment of whether authorities behaved fairly influences
the likelihood that they will comply with future legal directives.
163
These findings were originally taken from studies of mostly white
citizens, but since have been replicated among African-Americans and
Latinos. Huo and Tyler, for example, interviewed whites, Latinos, and
African Americans in Oakland and Los Angeles. They measured
satisfaction levels among those who had interactions with the police (either
calling the police or being stopped by the police). All three ethnic groups
reported similar outcomes, but African-Americans and Latinos perceived
158 Forman, supra note 87, at 155-56; Brent Staples, Growing Up to Fear the Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at A25 ("With reason, African-Americans tend to grow up believing
that the law is the enemy, because those who are sworn to uphold the law so often enforce it
in a biased way."); see also William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1795, 1798 (1998) ("Apparently racist enforcement standards tend to undermine the
normative force of the drug laws among targeted groups, to delegitimize the system in the
eyes of those whose behavior the system seeks to influence."); MARK H. MOORE & MARK A.
R. KLEIMAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING: THE POLICE AND
DRUGS 6 (1989) (stating that the current approach to drug enforcement "may alienate
communities from the police rather than build effective partnerships to control drugs," and
will thereby "inhibit the development of the self-defense capacities of the communities that
must, in the long run, be the route to success").
159 See generally YUEN J. HUO & TOM R. TYLER, How DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS REACT
TO LEGAL AUTHORITY (2000); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom R.
Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV.
361 (2001) [hereinafter Trust and Law Abidingness]; see also Kahan, supra note 3, at 1515-
20 (applying procedural justice literature to outline of theory of reciprocity).
160 Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness, supra note 159, at 367-68.
161 Id. at 383.
162 Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural
Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 166-67 (1997).
163 Id. at 192; Huo & TYLER, supra note 159, at 36-37.
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lower levels of procedural fairness. 164 These groups also reported lower
levels of overall satisfaction with the encounter, results that were driven by
a sense of unfair process, not unfavorable outcomes. 165
This procedural justice research cuts both ways. On the one hand, it
supports the notion that when authorities act in ways that are considered to
be procedurally unfair, they undermine their own legitimacy. They also
make it less likely that those who perceive they have been treated unfairly
will obey the law in the future. On the other hand, it suggests that
authorities have the power to increase their own legitimacy among the
policed. Especially promising is the finding that although ethnic groups
differ regarding whether they are treated fairly, they agree on what
constitutes fair treatment. For example, Huo and Tyler measured three
components of procedural fairness: (1) neutrality ("he/she treated me the
same as he/she would treat anyone else in that situation"); (2) benevolence
("he/she cared about my concerns"); and (3) status ("he/she treated me with
dignity and respect"). They found that for all three ethnic groups, these
process measures were more important in explaining variations in
perceptions of fairness than was outcome favorability. 166 In other words,
"[w]hen people said they were treated fairly, they meant that their standards
of neutrality, benevolence and status recognition had been met."'
' 67
The procedural justice literature, therefore, presents cause for
optimism. A fundamental premise of this Article is that the current
debilitating level of hostility between police and inner-city young people is
not inevitable. The procedural justice literature supports that notion. Law
enforcement cannot guarantee outcomes. At a community-wide level, the
police cannot, by and large, promise only to patrol certain areas or enforce
particular crimes. And at a personal level, they cannot guarantee the
outcome of any individual police-citizen encounter. Process, however, is
much more within their control. Moreover, as I will explore in the next
Section, community policing has the potential to deliver some of the
specific components of procedural fairness that researchers have found
matter.
IV. YOUTH AS ASSETS TO COMMUNITY POLICING: SOME PRINCIPLES OF
ENGAGEMENT
In this Section, I will discuss principles to govern a community
164 Huo & TYLER, supra note 159, at 31.
165 Id. at 35.




policing project that seriously engages young people. Though there
currently are no full-fledged programs along the lines of what I am
proposing, uniquely innovative community policing programs in Chicago
and Boston provide some important guideposts. First, a successful program
will offer participants real power over a broad scope of neighborhood
public safety issues. Second, increasing the diversity of the deliberative
body by adding younger participants makes it essential that the meetings be
led by trained facilitators using a structured deliberation process. Finally,
intermediary organizations, including churches, schools, and community
non-profits will likely need to have a rule to facilitate engagement and build
working partnerships.
A. POWER AND SCOPE.
As I discussed earlier, Chicago has the most thoroughly elaborated
community policing program of any large city in the country.' 68 Among its
successes has been generating high levels of participation in disadvantaged
neighborhoods. 169 Significant to that success has been that, unlike advisory
commissions, community boards, or discussion groups common in many
cities, in Chicago the neighborhood beat meetings have real power.
70
Rather than simply places to meet and talk, beat meetings are where
policing priorities for the community are established.' 7' Chicago Police
Department General Orders require that the police "beat teams" (typically
five patrol officers and their sergeant) attend beat meetings and "give...
special attention to the problems identified" there. 172  Still, police may
override the resident recommendations, both because "beat community
meetings may not be representative of the entire beat, and the problems they
identify may not be representative of the problems on the beat."'
173
Residents, in turn, may respond to objectionable police decisions (including
the decision not to follow their recommendations) at subsequent beat
meetings. 174 Fung cites the power afforded to citizens under the Chicago
community policing model as central to its success at securing high levels
of participation: "[e]ven the least well-off participate when doing so confers
powers upon them to address urgent issues such as neighborhood safety.' 75
168 See supra text accompanying note 26.
169 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
170 FUNG, supra note 28, at 4.
171 Id. at 65.
172 Id. (quoting General Orders).
173 Id. (quoting General Orders).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 111. An intriguing parallel to community policing in this regard is the teen
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Related to power is scope. By scope, I mean that the community
policing agenda must include a forum for regulating police conduct. Like
other citizens, neighborhood youth who come to the beat meetings will be
interested in working toward safer neighborhoods. But many of them are
also likely to bring concerns regarding police abuse or harassment. It is not
impossible to address both crime and police behavior, but it will only
happen if the space to do so is consciously created.
Boston provides some evidence that these two goals are compatible.
Boston had a severe crime problem that was accompanied by high levels of
hostility between police and the inner-city community. Boston tackled both
simultaneously. First, Boston recognized that its homicide problem was
highly concentrated: less than one percent of the adolescent and post-
adolescent age group was responsible for sixty percent of the city's
homicides. 176  By concentrating its efforts on this small group, Boston
officials capitalized on the desire of many young people, even some gang
members, to reduce their own exposure to violence.
177
At the same time, Boston enlisted community members in addressing
the problem of police harassment, another issue of great concern to the
community's young. Boston had previously fought gang and youth
violence under the warrior model. Boston's specialized anti-gang unit had
a mandate to, according to one police captain, "go in, kick butts, and crack
heads.' 78  To bridge the divide between police and community youth,
Boston officials worked closely with a group of ministers of inner-city
churches (the Ten Point Coalition). The ministers were an effective
intermediary due to their close connections with neighborhood youth and
court movement. Teen courts are those in which teens serve as judges or juries in cases
where other teens are charged with less serious offenses (e.g., shoplifting, vandalism, and
disorderly conduct). See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Butts & Janeen Buck, Teen Courts: A Focus on
Research, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention),
2000. The rapid growth of teen courts and their popularity with teens themselves is some
evidence that teens are willing to participate in programs-even those associated with law
enforcement-when such programs provide them with real influence in domains that they
feel matter. Furthermore, there is a substantial youth development literature suggesting that
a critical component of successful youth programs is that they offer the young the chance to
"matter"-to be efficacious in their social worlds. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMMUNITY PROGRAMS TO PROMOTE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 103-06 (Jacquelynne Eccles &
Jennifer Appleton Gootman eds., 2002).
176 Berrien & Winship, supra note 29, at 208.
177 David Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a
Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 478 (1997) (Boston's successful effort was
"due to the fact that not even gang members like being subjected to violence.... There was
thus an important, if generally unstated shared interest between the gangs and the authorities.
Both wanted the violence to stop.").
178 Berrien & Winship, supra note 29, at 205.
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long history of speaking against police abuse. 179
As I will discuss below, intermediaries are not the only approach. The
Chicago model of direct democratic governance would provide a forum for
interested youth to themselves raise concerns about police conduct in
neighborhood beat meetings. But the essential lesson of the Boston story is
that many youth and young adults will be concerned about crime and police
conduct, and the community policing model must be capable of addressing
both.
A community policing model that did this would not only have more
salience for many youth and young adults, it would also reduce the
likelihood that their more skeptical peers would object to their participation.
Currently, many youth and young adults avoid contact with law
enforcement because to be seen with the police signals to peers that one is
snitching, cooperating, or otherwise helping the enemy. The stigma against
participation can be counterproductive, for both parties benefit from citizen-
police cooperation. The police benefit from the information that citizens
provide, and citizens are better off with a police force that does not feel it
needs to rely on heavy-handed tactics to gather information. Community
policing might undermine the stigma against participation by making what
it means to engage with law enforcement more ambiguous. 180 Perhaps the
youth attending the beat meeting wants to provide information to the police
about law-breaking, but perhaps she seeks to protest police abuse, raise
concerns about a particular officer, or encourage the police to develop a
more narrowly tailored profile of what constitutes a potential drug dealer.
Rather than participation necessarily meaning cooperation with an alien
force, as it currently does, participation under this model might well be
interpreted by others as an act of community self-governance.1
8
'
To highlight what I mean by power and scope, let me contrast this
community policing model with what historically has been meant by youth
179 In this brief account of Boston's response to its youth violence crisis, I do not pretend
to do justice to the complex, multiple partnerships that ultimately proved essential to the
effort's success. In particular, it is worth noting that Boston invested in increased support
services for young people who were in trouble or at risk of becoming so. ELIKANN, supra
note 4, at 190-97. There is some evidence that the most successful efforts to replicate
Boston's success have also included such services. FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, CAUGHT
IN THE CROSSFIRE: ARRESTING GANG VIOLENCE BY INVESTING IN KIDS (2004) (identifying
successful programs in Boston, Philadelphia, and Baton Rouge).
180 Cf Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181,
2186-87 (1996) (state can "ambiguate" the social meaning of conduct based on how it
chooses to punish it).
181 Kahan, supra note 3, at 1537 (suggesting that those who participated in Chicago's




engagement. The history of community crime prevention is littered with
programs that were marked by police talking to citizens. In this regard,
anyone who has observed a variety of community crime prevention programs readily
ascertains that the bulk of the communication is from the police to the citizen,
explaining and selling prepackaged strategies devised without the particular
neighborhood and its residents' preferences in mind. Several evaluations of these
programs show that they emphasize organizing to do crime prevention, not to
stimulate the neighborhood to voice its demands in matters of police business.
18 2
This is especially true of law enforcement programs aimed at youth.
Modem community policing initiatives are not designed to engage young
people on either of the axes that matter most: they neither involve them in
the process of setting the neighborhood public safety agenda, nor do they
provide space for them to raise concerns regarding police conduct. Instead,
these programs typically involve police or other adults teaching lessons or
offering services to adolescents. Typical are these programs funded by the
Justice Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS): school based probation officers, violence prevention programs,
police magnet schools (in which students have the chance to work in police
stations, learn "lessons in fingerprinting, report writing and courtroom
procedures," and "wear Police Academy uniforms, which foster a sense of
cohesion and give them the feeling of being valued members of a peer
group"). 183 Whatever the merits of these programs, they serve a different
purpose, and have different benefits, than the type of community policing I
am emphasizing.
B. STRUCTURED DELIBERATION
Even in a relatively homogenous neighborhood, it is easy to imagine
community policing meetings falling apart quickly. In heterogeneous
groups, the concern is even greater. Some residents may come to the
meeting with an agenda, cling to it, and refuse to compromise or deliberate.
Others may try to exploit their cultural advantage or other sources of
relative power. And the more heterogeneous the group-including adding
younger citizens-the greater the risk that rifts will develop. As one person
asked me in a conversation about this project, "what happens at your
182 Mastrofski, supra note 62, at 52.
183 DYLAN PRESMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CREATIVE PARTNERSHIPS:
SUPPORTING YOUTH, BUILDING COMMUNITIES 2, 6, 9, 13-14 (2002); see also Jeff
Slowikowski & Helen Connelly, Community Policing and Youth, JUVENILE JUST. BULL.
(Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Programs), 1999, at 4-8 (describing similar
programs around the country).
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community policing meeting when the grandmothers say the young guys
standing on the corner at night are scary and need to go and the young guys
respond, 'we are just hanging out."" 184
Before addressing this quite serious concern, I should point out its
limits. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that if such divisions
exist within communities, they do so regardless of whether a wider range of
neighborhood residents attend community policing meetings. Having
young people at the meeting is not what causes the disagreement with the
grandmothers about who should be on the street corner-it simply provides
a forum for that issue to arise. Moreover, just as the disagreement pre-dates
youth attendance at the community policing meeting, so does its resolution.
Currently, the issues are, as we have seen, largely resolved at the expense of
the young people who are not engaged in the agenda-setting process. As a
result (at least in part) of their non-participation, they become targets of a
police force mobilized on behalf of those constituents who are present and
helping to set policing priorities.
But even if it is true that community policing meetings do not create
community divisions, it is nonetheless the case that the meetings provide an
opportunity for the divisions to come to the fore. There is no easy answer
to the question of how to ensure effective deliberation among diverse
constituencies.1 85  But Archon Fung's detailed analysis of Chicago's
community policing program in action helps provide a context in which to
think about these questions. Although community policing in Chicago did
not have to bridge substantial age differences (most participants were
middle-aged and over), some of the neighborhoods were racially and
economically diverse. Some heterogeneous neighborhoods succeeded in
having effective meetings, bridging differences, and reaching a shared
vision. Others did not. Typically, what made the difference was the
presence (or absence) of a trained facilitator to lead the group in a
184 It is worth reiterating that the discussion may go in counter-intuitive directions.
Remember that young people in Chicago were more likely than older residents to perceive
that street crime and burglaries were neighborhood problems. See supra note 74. For a
discussion of the tensions that arise when police engage communities that are not of one
mind, and which may not be of the same mind as the police, see generally David Thacher,
Conflicting Values in Community Policing, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 765 (2001).
185 There is an extensive political science literature regarding the design of deliberative
democratic institutions. For a recent review, see ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 92-103 (2004); see also
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEv. L.J.
(forthcoming 2004) (describing variety of attempts to "operationalize democratic
participation in contested legal and social issues").
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structured, deliberative process. 186
As part of CAPS, Chicago hired a community-based organization to
provide facilitators to neighborhoods. The facilitators spent three to six
months attending a particular neighborhood's beat meetings, and trained
both officers and community residents in the deliberative problem solving
approach that the city hoped would guide beat meetings. 187 To summarize,
the approach had five steps. 88 First, meeting participants identified and
prioritized neighborhood problems, with an eye toward taking vague or
general concerns and breaking them into component parts. Second,
participants proposed, justified, and selected provisional strategies to
respond to the problems identified in step one. Discussion and deliberation
were central here, because typically more strategies were proposed than
could be adopted. Step three was implementation of the strategies. The
fourth step was monitoring and evaluating, in which participants would
report back on the results of the implementation stage, and agree to
continue, abandon, or modify the strategy originally adopted. The final step
was reiteration, which encouraged the group to begin steps 1-4 over again,
and invited participants to see the process as ongoing and iterative.
To understand the role played by facilitators in overcoming some of
the deliberation challenges I identified previously, compare two Chicago
neighborhoods that participated in the community policing project. Traxton
is a neighborhood divided by race, class, and geography. 89 On the west
side of the tracks, the neighborhood is wealthier and whiter, and on the east
side, while not impoverished, it is poorer and blacker. The crime problems
on the east side of the neighborhood are, most objective observers would
agree, more serious. However, before the arrival of a trained facilitator,
west side residents dominated the unstructured, town hall style meetings-
they spoke more, they articulated their concerns in a way that police could
understand more easily, and they demanded (and received) more concrete
police responses. At one meeting for example, a west side complaint of
"noise at the pancake house" received more attention (and greater police
response) than east side complaints of an unsolved homicide and intrusive
police surveillance.
It would be tempting to conclude that the west side residents were
determined, at all costs, to prioritize their concerns, even if they were
objectively less urgent. At it turns out, this was not the case. Some months
186 See LEIB, supra note 185, at 102 (discussing research suggesting the importance of
moderators).
187 FUNG, supra note 28, at 73.
188 This process is outlined in greater detail in id. at 56-60.
189 This summary of the Traxton experience is drawn from id. at 173-97.
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after the meetings began, a trained facilitator (who was also a west side
resident) began leading them. Using the deliberation process described
above, the facilitator encouraged east side residents to state and discuss
their problems, and did not allow the meeting to move on until all the
problems had been identified. The principal east side concern was a drug
house, which further discussion revealed had been close to the epicenter of
much criminal activity, including two homicides over the previous three
years. Although the issue of the noise at the pancake house was raised
again, all residents-both west and east siders-agreed that the drug house
was the most important issue. The months that followed were similar, with
the bulk of police and community attention focusing on east side problems.
Consider next Southtown, a Chicago neighborhood that faces arguably
even greater challenges to effective community self-governance. 190 Poorer
than Traxton, Southtown is also more divided-while Traxton's two halves
had ignored each other, Southtown is divided between blacks and Hispanics
who, at times, have been in conflict with each other. Further, relations
between residents and police are even worse than relations between
different groups of residents. As with Traxton, the presence of trained
facilitators leading discussions would prove critical.
One particularly vexing neighborhood problem was a park and
recreation center that the city had closed in response to gang violence.
Despite (or more likely, because of) its closing, the park continued to be a
focal point for violence. Hispanic residents originally opposed identifying
the park as a top priority because it was in the black part of the
neighborhood and therefore largely a "black" problem. Through a series of
facilitated discussions, black residents were able to produce data to
demonstrate that the park was truly an urgent crime priority. Further, they
pointed out that the park was near the border with the Hispanic
neighborhood and promised to make it accessible to all ethnic groups. The
Hispanic participants eventually were persuaded, and blacks and Hispanics
agreed that the next priority would be chosen from the Hispanic part of the
community. Eventually, with the help of increased police surveillance and
by lobbying the city, residents were able to re-open the park. The "Friends
of the Park" group they created made good on the promise of opening the
park to everyone-they began multi-cultural programming and hired two
full time staff members, one Spanish speaking and one black.
While this was unquestionably a community policing success story,
after six months the facilitators left. Almost immediately, the deliberative
process began to break down. The facilitators had put extra effort into
190 This summary of the Southtown experience is drawn from id. at 197-2 10.
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ensuring Hispanic participation, but after their departure fewer and fewer
Hispanic community members attended the meetings. Small decisions
matter in community organizing: after the facilitators left, the remaining
participants moved the meeting space to a location in the black community,
further depressing Hispanic participation.
This downward spiral was matched by the steady deterioration of
police-community relations. The facilitators had worked to ensure that
residents identified specific problems that allowed for concrete police
responses. In their absence, residents proved unable to break down their
complaints in such a manner. Officers, for their part, lacked the skills to do
this themselves, and instead rejected citizens' concerns as vague and
unworkable. This frustrated residents, and as all sides became increasingly
dissatisfied, the Southtown beat meetings fell apart.
The Traxton and Southtown experiences suggest that diverse groups-
even those who see each other as the problem--can participate in effective
public deliberation around community safety issues. This is good news for
the youth-engaged model that I am proposing, for it is likely that young
people initially will be viewed with suspicion by some community
members and officers. But these examples also suggest that community
members cannot do it alone. Particularly with a heterogeneous group, the
presence of trained facilitators leading a structured deliberation process
must be continuous and ongoing. Chicago was right to invest in facilitators;
its mistake was to think that they would be able to train residents and move
on to the next community. Years (indeed centuries, in some cases) of
hostility, mistrust, or non-cooperation cannot be overcome in a six month
training period.
I have focused on trained facilitators leading a process of structured
deliberation because I believe it presents the greatest prospect of systemic
success. It is nonetheless true that enlightened police leadership, guided by
a series of ethical commitments, can play a similar function and bridge
disagreements in heterogeneous communities. Consider David Thacher's
example of former Lowell, Massachusetts, Police Chief Ed Davis.191 Davis,
an early advocate of community policing, faced a decision about where to
place a police substation. These substations were very popular with Lowell
residents, and residents of the mostly white and politically well-connected
Cupples Square neighborhood had mobilized effectively to demand that
their area receive the next one.
191 For a longer discussion of this example, and for other similar instances of effective
police leaders working with community partners, see David Thacher, Equity and Community
Policing: A New View of Community Partnerships, 20 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (2001).
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But Davis believed that crime rates and other concerns suggested that
the substation was most needed in the nearby, largely Cambodian, Lower
Highlands neighborhood. There was a community meeting scheduled on
the issue; without intervention, Davis knew that the wealthier and whiter
residents would turn out in great numbers and demand the substation. In
response, Davis gathered all the data he could on the needs of the two
neighborhoods and, with assistance, encouraged large numbers of the
Cambodian community to attend the meeting. After hearing the evidence
and discussing it and other concerns, the majority of the Cupples Square
residents were persuaded to change their positions, and agreed that the
Cambodian neighborhood needed the substation more.
This is another example that, under the right conditions, "public
deliberation may filter self-regarding, individualistic demands in ways that
lead to public-regarding choices."' 92 As a reform model, however, it relies
on the presence of particularly effective leadership that is guided by
commitments to both equity and public participation. Therefore, though it
is worth aspiring to, it is more difficult to institutionalize than the facilitated
deliberation model I have described.
C. INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS
The community policing programs in Chicago and Boston both rely on
intermediary organizations to achieve their goals. Chicago's community
policing project is an exercise in direct democracy, with citizens speaking
for themselves at neighborhood beat meetings. Nonetheless, it relies on
community organizers to serve as intermediaries, especially with
populations that have not historically been active in politics or voluntary
organizations. Community organizers play a key role in mobilizing these
populations in Chicago. In addition to the massive public awareness
campaign, at the grassroots level community organizers make phone calls
and go door-to-door to increase awareness and participation.193 Boston
relies even more heavily on intermediary organizations-there the Ten
Point Coalition of ministers plays this role and represents the interests of
community residents, including young people.
The need for intermediary organizations will be especially crucial in a
community policing project that seeks to engage young people, who have
not historically seen high levels of civil engagement. As Southtown
organizers found when working with a Hispanic community previously
192 Id. at 12.
193 See supra text accompanying note 66; see also FUNG, supra note 28, at 197-206
(describing community organizing efforts in Hispanic community).
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disconnected from politics, the process will require the involvement of
intermediary adults who are, unlike the police, trusted. As the Southtown
experience further suggests, physical location matters-to that end, places
where the young already meet and form organizations are among the most
promising venues. These principles suggest that schools and other youth-
serving organizations may be appropriate intermediaries.
In communities with established networks of community-based
organizations working with young people, such groups might be a natural
choice to play the intermediary role of mobilizing the young, ensuring turn-
out, facilitating meetings, and gaining the trust of local police officials and
other community leaders. 194 Though a less obvious choice, some schools
also might perform this function. Schools have certain natural advantages.
Students spend eighteen percent of their waking hours in school-no other
institution has similar access. 195 Accordingly, many teachers, counselors,
and coaches have already built relationships with, and earned the trust of,
both current students and recent graduates. Perhaps as a result of this adult
influence, students whose schools encourage community service and
volunteering are more likely to participate than those from schools who do
not. 196 Further, schools have their own stake in protecting students from
both crime and unfair police targeting, as students are especially likely to
fall victim to crime while going to or from school.
197
Moreover, some trends in education practice suggest that at least some
schools want to push beyond the boundaries of the typical school function
and embrace a broader agenda. The community schools movement, for
example, calls for schools to become hubs for a variety of community-
based resources (including health centers, family counseling groups,
tutoring, and mentoring organizations, etc.). 198 A related movement calls
'9' See generally MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KIDS, COPS, AND
COMMUNITIES (1998) (describing efforts by youth-serving organizations to address crime
and delinquency issues); MILBREY W. MCLAUGHLIN, PUBLIC EDUCATION NETWORK,
COMMUNITY COUNTS: How YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS MATTER FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
(2000), available at www.publiceducation.org/PENreports.asp (describing role that
community-based youth-serving organizations play in youth development).
195 Denise C. Gottredson et al., The Schools, in CRIME: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR CRIME
CONTROL 149, 159 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002).
196 VIRGINIA HODGKINSON ET AL., VOLUNTEERING AND GIVING AMONG TEENAGERS 12 TO
17 YEARS OF AGE, at 3-57 (1997).
197 Id. at 158.
198 COALITION FOR COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, COMMUNITY SCHOOLS: PARTNERSHIPS FOR
EXCELLENCE 2-3 (2000), available at www.communityschools.org/pubs.coal.html; see also
METRO. FORUM PROJECT, WHAT IF? 3-4 (1999), at http://www.nsbn.org/publications/whatif




for schools to explicitly foster a sense of civic mission in students.199
Recognizing the limits of doing this simply through teaching government
and history classes, this movement seeks to involve students in
extracurricular activities in which students participate directly in matters of
politics and local governance.2 °0
In addition to traditional schools, locally controlled schools, such as
charter schools, might serve as partners. Locally controlled schools arise
from the same impulse as community policing: both reflect a
disappointment with the failure of administrative bureaucracies to deliver
basic public services, especially in urban areas. Both are premised on the
notion that direct democratic governance of local institutions may, under
the right circumstances, improve the quality of educational and public
safety institutions.20'
Charter schools, for example, are disproportionately located in urban
areas. 202 Many of the same teenagers who are the least likely to have been
engaged in positive collaboration with law enforcement attend such
schools.20 3 Moreover, many charter schools are started by community-
based organizations and coalitions of various local constituencies, many of
which have a mandate that is broader than simply education.20 4 These
groups are substantially more likely than the traditional school system to
welcome such opportunities for police-student collaboration, and to be
willing to make their school facility and students available for meetings and
other activities. In addition, the structure of the schools makes it easier for
199 Cf Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) ("[P]ublic education
must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to
the practice of self-government in the community and the nation.") (quoting C. BEARD & M.
BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
200 David Broder, Schools' Civic Mission, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at B7. For an
especially thoughtful collection of essays making the argument for civic education, see
MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Diane Ravitch & Joseph Viteritti
eds., 2001).
201 See, e.g., FUNG, supra note 28, at 2-5.
202 ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD
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them to act on these impulses.20 5 Charter and other locally controlled
schools typically are less hierarchical, and more nimble. They are therefore
more equipped to create effective partnerships with other organizations,
including police departments and other neighborhood community safety
groups.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article's central claim has been that community policing falls
short of its potential as long as the young are excluded from the community
policing agenda-setting process and, instead, are policed under the
discredited warrior model of policing. More optimistically, I have
suggested that it is possible to build on existing community policing models
to develop an approach that would, for the first time in modem policing,
fundamentally alter the relationship between police and the young in the
inner city. One reason to be optimistic about the prospect of reform now is
that crime has declined significantly in the past decade, and drops in youth
crime have led the way. For example, the juvenile arrest rate for serious
violent crimes fell forty-four percent between 1994 and 2001, putting it at
its lowest level since 1983.206 It is possible that just as rising crime rates
helped create an image of the young as threats, declining crime might create
an opportunity to change that image, thereby allowing us to see the young
as the potential assets that they are.
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Charter Schools, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 291, 303 (2000).
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